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Duty As An End In Itself H.
K. Kesavan One of the hotly debated subjects in philosophy is
whether duty is a means to an end or whether it is an end in itself. There are
eminent philosophers who take rival
positions on this important question and therefore it is of interest to know
the manner in which Vedic philosophy
resolves this controversy. For purposes
of this discussion, we assume a
knowledge of the four goals of human
life according to Vedic philosophy: the
two secular goals of pleasure and security
(artha and kama), and the last two spiritual
goals (dharma and moksha) which we have already discussed elsewhere. This conception of values as embodied in
these four goals provides the framework for
investigating the meaning of
duty from the very source where the
conflicting views arise.
If actions are exclusively devoted to the satisfaction of the secular goals, without any thought given to advance
towards the achievement of spiritual goals, they are not deemed as moral
actions. This distinguishing feature of
moral actions gives rise to the negative criterion for duty; moral life would per force necessitate placing suitable constraints on the reckless pursuit of seeking
gratification of one’s natural
inclinations of life. Pursuit of secular goals while they are both essential
and legitimate, their limitless
pursuits, however, are deemed harmful
for working for the higher goals in
life. The nature of the limiting
constraints that ensures that no such harm is done will become
clear as we proceed to formulate a
positive purpose for performing duty.
We shall next examine what sorts of actions are
deemed appropriate for the pursuit of spiritual goals. Such actions are
called moral actions. It is common knowledge that all actions are performed
with definite ends in view, and moral actions are no exception in this
regard. No action is possible without
the consciousness of an end in view; it will always have a positive purpose. It
follows from this observation that if moral actions do not result in the
achievement of the ends, the limits placed on the pursuit of secular goals,
which constitute the negative criterion of moral action, will be utterly meaningless since they only
impose unnecessary hardship on the agent. No rational being will subscribe to
the concept of duty that is barren of a positive purpose. We will investigate
what this purpose could be by considering several possibilities.
The happiness derived from meeting secular goals without any constraints imposed on them is
called egoistic hedonism. It considers the pursuit of pleasures and
security as the be all and end all of life. If
such a pattern of life is not considered moral, one could then examine
whether egoistic hedonism along with a universal form of it, namely, bestowing equal care on ensuring the
well-being of others exclusively in the secular realm could serve as the
positive purpose of a moral action. But a combined form of these two forms of
hedonism, the egoistic and the universal, is considered impossible since
experience informs us that one’s own interests are very often at odds with the interests of others and it
is impossible to bring about a reconciliation between the two. Consequently, this possibility also has to
be abandoned in our search for a positive purpose for duty. We shall next examine whether disinterested altruism could serve as a useful approach to the problem that we have posed. By this we mean, that an agent is neither interested in egoistic hedonism nor in the concurrent pursuit of egoistic hedonism and universal hedonism. Instead, he is totally interested in working for the secular welfare of others. But this possibility also has several inherent weaknesses to it. First of all, it is patently absurd to assume that one could unfailingly achieve someone else’s happiness at all times through one’s actions. What the other person does for himself will also naturally influence the agent's state of mind. Secondly, even if an action is performed with a bad intention towards another person it can, under some circumstances, result in immense benefit to the other; one may be blissfully unaware of the motive of the action of the benefactor and will gladly accept the result if it suits the recipient's purpose, without any interest in psycho-analyzing the
intentions of the benefactor. In
either case, we come to the conclusion that disinterested altruism cannot
provide the positive purpose for duty. Having disposed of the above three possibilities in
our search for a positive purpose for a moral action, we finally track it down
to the situation where it arises. We start our discussion of this case by first
recalling our basic observation that
self-consciousness is a special endowment of human beings. In our discussion of Ethics,
we stated the principle of reciprocity
in human relations, a principle that
logically followed from the very
plausible inference that others also
have likes and dislikes similar to those of what we experience. The principle,
in a nutshell, states that wisdom would
behoove that we do good to others in order to ensure equally good reciprocal
treatment from them. We further pointed out that the reciprocity principle that
is based on conscious fellowship remains only in the realm of thought, but, in
practice, it results in a clash between thought and action because of people’s
natural propensity to accord better
preference to the satisfaction of their own interests compared to those of others. We accounted this unfortunate
failing to the double nature of the human mind, resulting from the inner
conflict between the lower self that looks to the preservation of one’s
own interests as a matter of priority
and the higher self which goads one to place others’ interests above those of
one’s own. It is essentially a conflict between thought and will, the thought
that vouches for the soundness of the reciprocity principle and the will that
pulls in the opposite direction of not putting it into practice. The positive purpose of a moral action can be
clearly defined in terms of the dilemma posed by the double nature of the mind.
It is to eliminate the cleavage that exists between the lower self and the
higher self by means of rectification of
the will to facilitate the
response to the prompting of the higher self. A moral action has two
facets to it: first, it should be able to curb the undisciplined impulses that
are solely directed towards the satisfaction of the natural inclinations; this is the negative aspect of moral action.
The second facet to moral action, which is a positive one, is to ensure
that all actions are done with the
superior purpose of harnessing the will in the proper direction. It is only in
the field of action that one can introduce the constant corrections to the
human will and bring it in synchronism with what is expected of it by the
higher self. Although we have discussed the two aspects of moral action
separately for purposes of analysis, what happens in practice is that progress
achieved in one aspect will bring about progress in the other because they are
mutually coupled. All actions for doing altruistic deeds are viewed as
opportunities for achieving this higher discipline, the rectification of the
will, and with practice, they become second nature to the individual and so
effortless in nature. The importance of
doing altruistic deeds is not in the external consequences of the deeds, but
because of the opportunities they afford for the internal cultivation of the
mind. By this observation, we are not suggesting that one should be indifferent
to the good of others, but we are only drawing attention to the primary purpose
of heeding the call of the higher self. Constant practice in the rectification
and transformation of the will result in a state of happiness that is much superior to the state of happiness
that characterizes egoistic hedonism. The latter type of happiness is only
transitory in nature whereas the former one is stable and enduring. If this
were not true, and if we were only left with the onerous task of satisfying the
negative condition, life would have been one of meaningless drudgery. It is the
happiness resulting from the positive purpose that provides the necessary
incentive for the transformation of
one’s own personality by performing the right type of moral actions.
Normally speaking, when we perform an action, we are
conscious of the results we are expecting from it. But, while performing a
duty, we cannot always be conscious of the final aim of rectification of the will which is rather in
the abstract realm. The immediate incentive for a moral action comes from our
ability to distinguish what is right from wrong and accordingly act on what is
right. The main reason for not being conscious of the final aim in any single
action is because all actions have the
same purpose: strengthen the will so that the gap between thought and
action in the light of the reciprocity
principle is continually reduced with the resulting happiness that follows from
it. But more importantly, the result of
a moral action is not external to duty; it is not something that accrues after
its performance. The reward for a moral action is contained in the process
itself. This is in stark contrast to what we normally mean by an action where
results follow an action. Egoistic hedonism or a universal form of hedonism
that we discussed earlier are examples where
results are external to the actions performed. Such results may or may
not follow the actions, whereas there is no such uncertainty involved in the
performance of a duty; it will undoubtedly result in the further rectification
of the will. The resulting happiness, being associated with the higher
self, is of a much superior and
enduring type than the kind of pleasure that one experiences in the
satisfaction of purely secular goals. In fact, the secular end and the spiritual
end result in altogether two different orders of happiness. Reverting back to the controversy whether duty is a
means to an end or an end in itself, we
can suggest a solution to this riddle by pointing out that the conflict is not
between duty and end, but between the two orders of end; the lower order that
is associated with the sole satisfaction of the secular goals and the higher order that is associated with
the continual refinement of the human will inspired by the spiritual goals. The
school which holds that duty is a means to an end is correct in its assertion
when the end considered is the secular end. And the school which holds that
duty is an end in itself is also correct in holding that position when the end
considered is the spiritual goal where the end is not external to duty. An
action becomes moral when it selects the higher order in preference to the
lower. By moral life, we mean that one has given permanent commitment to the
performance of duty. At this final stage of our discussion, we wish to point out where the connection to
metaphysics becomes necessary to explore the complete meaning of duty. We
started the discussion for identifying the positive purpose of moral action on
the concepts of the principle of reciprocity and the double nature of the mind
consisting of the higher self and the lower self. The cleavage between the two is never completely reconciled
unless we have the concept of the highest self which is a metaphysical concept.
It is the Self of Vedic philosophy that is not in time but in eternity and
which represents the highest ideal of life.
It represents a state not only of moral
rectification but of total moral perfection. There is nothing about such an
attainment. Attainment of this ideal is what is called moksha which is the highest
conception of value on the part of a
human being. We have not brought in this concept of Self for our discussion
because it was possible to deduce the true meaning of duty even by confining
our discussion to the finite world of time and appealing to facts based on
experience of our human condition. Accordingly, the concept of higher self was
all that was necessary for the purpose.
Furthermore, the rate of change that occurs in practice of the higher self is
such that our discussion will not lose its meaning without appealing to the
Self. The results will be valid for anyone living in any society for a
considerable length of time. In conclusion, we wish to state that the concept of Self should not be looked upon as a distant and misty ideal. Intellectual knowledge of it combined with a life devoted to moral rectification will enable a person to experience a glimpse of it through a yogic discipline. That is the assurance given by people all over the world who have followed this path. It is the momentary experiences of Self, the final goal of life, that has the certain potential to dissolve all manner of doubts about the wisdom of opting for leading a moral life. A person who is leading such a life will not have any confusion about the meaning of duty; it is both a means to an end as well as an end in itself in the light of what we have defined as the two distinct ends.
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